Is Voting Haram? The Islamic Ruling on Elections | Blog

With elections nearing in the United States, individuals in the Muslim community are offering their views on who to vote for or whether we should vote at all. Given the backdrop of the ongoing genocide in Gaza and the US’s direct role therein, the stakes seem particularly high, and Muslims are contentiously discussing—at a very fundamental level—what it means to build power and craft an appropriate political strategy. Undoubtedly, strengthening Muslim influence hinges on acting in a coordinated fashion. However, there still remains much confusion within the community when it comes to basic rulings on political actions, like voting. Addressing this issue to the satisfaction of our communities is necessary for the effective mobilizing of mass participation in electoral politics. In this vein, this post seeks to deliver clarity to scrupulous Muslims on the status of voting in Islamic law and its potential consequences in the afterlife.

Rulings on all subjects in Islam are dependent upon how they are characterized. In short, a scholar begins with conceptual categories that are found in classical Islamic scholarship and then attempts to map contemporary phenomena onto those categories. Ambiguity ensues when a novel matter does not match these received conceptual categories neatly, such as the difficulty in assessing modern commercial contracts which share elements of both rent and sale, two distinct categories in Islamic commercial law. In this case, voting is no different, having been likened to several categories, such as legal testimony (shahāda), recommendation (tazkiyya), allegiance (bayʿa), proxy (wakāla), and consultation (shūra).

A useful roundup of various scholarly treatments on voting has been written by Dr. Fahad Saleh al-Ajlan, a professor in the Department of Islamic Studies at the College of Education at King Saud University, titled al-Intikhābāt wa aḥkāmuhā fī al-fiqh al-Islamī  (Elections and Their Rulings in Islamic Jurisprudence). Dr. al-Ajlan clarifies that there is no disagreement on the permissibility of voting if it is restricted to ahl al-ḥal wa al-ʿaqd (those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community, such as scholars), as was done by ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb to appoint his successor as caliph. In such a scenario, a focus group of highly eminent and qualified individuals are given equal votes and a simple majority determines the outcome. Where the scholars differ, according to Dr. al-Ajlan, is in two matters: (1) Are general elections valid as a tool of proper Islamic governance? and (2) If we happen to live in a society that is not governed by the Shariah, is it permissible to vote in general elections if our intention is purely to reduce harm and improve the situation of Muslims? In this piece, we focus on Dr. al-Ajlan’s treatment of the second question.

In this regard, scholars fall into two camps. The first camp—represented by Sh. Salah al-Sawi, Sh. ʿUmar al-Ashqar, Sh. Ali al-Ghamidi, Sh. Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, Sh. Muhammad b. ʿUthaymin, and Sh. Muhammad Abu Zahra—holds that participation in  elections for non-Islamic governance is permissible if the intent of voters thereby is to apply Islamic norms as much as possible and change the current system for the better. Their evidence is that in this context:

Opposing this camp is a group, including Abd al-Ghani al-Rihal, Abd al-Munʾim Halima, Sami al-Dalal, and Muhammad Mufti, who hold that participation in such elections is impermissible, even with the ‘proper’ intention. Their arguments can be summarized as follows:

The key difference between the two opinions here is that the first camp primarily characterizes voting as a tool and thus an issue of fiqh (Islamic law), whereas the second primarily characterizes voting as an expression of approval or allegiance and thus an issue of ʿaqīda. This difference of characterization is crucial and determines upon whom the burden of proof lies to necessitate a following.

Though one often hears definitive statements like “the Prophet ﷺ and the Companions did not do it, so it is haram,” this sentiment can only be applicable for ʿaqīda issues and issues of ritual worship, as opposed to interpersonal transactions (muʿāmalāt), administration (idāra), or even politics (siyāsa). To say that voting is haram (religiously forbidden) because the Prophet and his Companions didn’t do it assumes that voting is an issue of ʿaqīda. Now, for voting to be classified as an issue of ʿaqīda, it must necessarily indicate approval of a system that grants undue sovereignty and legislative power—a dubious conclusion to arrive at for several reasons. Granted, if someone goes to the polls believing that man-made laws are better than Allah’s legislation, or that the system they are participating in is more just than the system introduced by the Prophet, this is certainly an act of kufr and outside the scope of the scholarly disagreement. However, most people, including most non-Muslims, don’t approach voting with these beliefs or intentions. Many even vote reluctantly, out of a sense of civic duty or in an attempt to lessen harm and avoid falling into the category of those who lose their societal right to complain due to their civic disengagement. Moreover, if all participation in a non-Islamic form of governance were tantamount to kufr, regardless of one’s intention, it would contradict well known examples to the contrary that are found in both the Qur’an and the Sunnah. For example, in the Qur’an Allah describes a believer in Pharaoh’s court. Certainly, Pharaoh’s administration was diametrically opposed to tawḥīd, yet this believer’s participation within Pharaoh’s court is not described as blameworthy whatsoever. Another example from within the context of the Shariah would be the Negus of Abyssinia who secretly converted to Islam but continued to rule his non-Muslim subjects, presumably according to laws other than what Allah sent down. If ruling by other than what Allah sent down was tantamount to kufr in all cases, the Prophet would not have instructed the Muslims to pray over the Negus upon his death.

Despite this, juristic inference (istidlāl) is often employed by those opposed to voting and is taken from the seemingly clear-cut verses below:

In Surah al-Māida, Allah says,

In Surah al-Nisāʾ, He also asks,

In some instances, the following verse from Surah al-Anʿām is also used,

From these verses, it is understood that Allah establishes His monopoly over legitimate legislation and that this characteristic is essential to Allah. As a result, whoever is attempting to allow human beings to legislate without authority from Allah is held to be not only sinful, but also as profaning Allah’s very tawḥīd (divine unicity) and potentially nullifying their faith, removing them from the fold of Islam. However, such conclusions present several problematic issues because, although the verses appear general and broad in application, they are in reality specified by both scripture and reason.

First, the verses cannot possibly mean that all examples of ruling by other than Allah’s law are kufr. This is because, in addition to the example of the Negus mentioned earlier, if these verses did in fact carry their general, apparent meaning, then a corrupt judge (qāḍī) who accepts bribes and issues verdicts contrary to the truth would, in fact, be guilty of kufr—a conclusion not held by any of the scholars of fiqh. In reality, these verses were understood by the early Muslim generations (salaf) and the scholars to be more specific than they appear. For example, Ibn ʿAbbās stated that whoever disputes what Allah has revealed has committed kufr, but whoever affirms it yet fails to implement it is guilty of oppression and disobedience. ʿAṭāʾ stated that the kufr referenced in the aforementioned verse (Qur’an 5:44) is not the same as what is typically referred to as kufr (kufr dūn al-kufr). Ṭāwūs stated that the kufr mentioned here is not the type of kufr that removes one from the fold of Islam. Al-Qurṭubī also said that the same verse was revealed about the disbelievers and applies only to them, rather than the believers. Regarding the verse in Surah al-Nisāʾ, it is known to have been revealed in the context of someone who had the ability to take his case to the Prophet, but instead chose to take it to someone else—a situation far from analogous to Muslim minorities voting within a non-Muslim political system not of their choosing and with no alternative, accessible form of Islamic governance in place. In fact, both the verse in Surah al-Māida and the verse in Surah al-Nisāʾ are more aptly applied to situations where someone fails to rule by Islamic norms despite having the authority or opportunity to do so, not situations where there is no choice but the non-Islamic alternative.

Second, the aforementioned verses do not imply that any rule not found in the Shariah necessarily equates to a ruling by something other than what Allah revealed. If they did, they would implicate even the Companions, who continued to extend the Shariah to novel situations and circumstances, or their successors who developed institutions and administrative regulations to facilitate their worldly and religious matters. Modern applications of this include school boards, municipal elections, and departments of transportation, where rules are made that are neither found in nor necessarily contradict the Shariah.

Third, participation in a system does not necessarily indicate perpetuating it. In fact, quite the contrary, similarly to how Karl Marx understood capitalism as a necessary historical stage that would create the conditions for the forthcoming socialist revolution, participation can be a powerful tool to change a system. Moreover, systems that are coercive in nature go on with or without popular participation. Believing that withholding participation in elections will accelerate the fall of democracy almost takes Locke’s theory of social contract literally—that governments only have power because we allow them to. Instead, we must realize that he and others like him merely provided a legitimizing discourse for the nascent liberal nation-states. The concept of a social contract, where people agree to accept government authority, is likely better reflected in the bayʿa given to the righteous Caliphs than in modern nation-states, which were established almost exclusively through violence. Since even today’s democracies are established by unilateral force, the idea of withdrawing support to weaken them makes little sense. Realistically, if everyone stayed home and refused to vote, would governments acknowledge their illegitimacy and disband or would they find an excuse to continue ruling? History suggests the latter. One could argue that withdrawing support would at least crack the facade of popular consent covering up the unilateral coercion lying beneath, but that is a debate of political strategy, not fiqh or ʿaqīda.

All this is to say that since voting does not seem to be inherently an act of worship, devotion, or creed, it would appear that the default ruling on voting is permissibility. Consequently, there is no need for a precedent among the salaf (although one could argue that there is) and the burden of proof lies on those opposed to voting in a non-Islamic form of governance to demonstrate that it is, in fact, impermissible. In the conclusion of the relevant chapter in Dr. al-Ajlan’s work, he provides his own significant reflection: the aforementioned discussion deals with voting in elections within a Muslim-majority society that is not governed by Islamic law, so what about a Muslim minority participating in general elections in a mostly non-Muslim society? He opines that participating in such elections would have greater benefit and less harm than if it were in a Muslim-majority society because there is no risk of giving legitimacy to or expressing approval of a system of government that is against the Shariah. In fact, he says explicitly that in such a situation “Muslims’ participation does not strengthen their kufr.”

Electoral politics is merely one avenue for political change. A mature political disposition eschews treating electoral candidates as saviors and realizes that voting in elections is but one tool among many. Attention to electoral politics should never make people blind to other forms of political engagement that attract less attention, nor should the competitive and personal nature of elections lead people to lose sight of the overarching objectives, causing them to over-affiliate with a personality or a political tribe and give them undue loyalty and impunity. Doing so is disempowering and conceals the ways in which voting as a tool can be used for other purposes, such as drawing attention to and abandoning an elected official or party on account of their poor political behavior.

Electoral politics deserves our attention. The last year has shown us that elected officials are positioned to craft deadly policy and marshal the resources to implement it. Going forward, Muslims in the West should dedicate sufficient intellectual and financial resources to grassroots efforts that will steer electoral politics in ways favorable to our ummah, including and perhaps beginning with, the end of the genocide in Gaza.